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Abstract—Adequate AC power is required for decay heat1
removal in nuclear power plants. Station blackout accidents,2
therefore, are a very critical phenomenon to their safety. Though3
designed to cope with them, nuclear power plants can only do4
so for a limited time, without risking core damage and possible5
catastrophe. The impact of station blackouts on nuclear power6
plant safety is determined by their frequency, as well as duration.7
These quantities, currently, are computed via a static fault tree8
analysis which applicability deteriorates with increasing system9
size and complexity. This paper proposes a novel alternative10
framework based on a hybrid of Monte Carlo methods, multi-11
state modelling, and network theory. The intuitive framework,12
which is applicable to a variety of station blackout problems,13
can provide a complete insight into their risks. Most importantly,14
its underlying modelling principles are generic, and, therefore,15
applicable to non-nuclear system reliability problems, as well.16
When applied to the Maanshan nuclear power plant in Taiwan,17
the results validate the framework as a rational decision-support18
tool in the mitigation and prevention of station blackouts.19
Index Terms—Nuclear Power Plant, Station Blackout, Risk20
Assessment, Accident Recovery, Monte Carlo Simulation21
NOTATIONS22
min (B) Least element of set/vector B.23
min{B,Q} Least element of B ∪Q.24
(B, i) ith element of set/vector B.25
ABBREVIATIONS26
AC Alternating Current.27
DC Direct Current.28
C Node capacity.29
CCF Common-Cause Failure.30
CCG Common-Cause Group.31
CS Cold standby state.32
F Failed state.33
LOOP Loss of offsite power.34
MCS Monte-Carlo simulation.35
S Shutdown state.36
SBO Station blackout.37
SU Start-up state.38
TM Test/preventive maintenance state.39
W Working state.40
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NOMENCLATURE41
A System adjacency matrix.42
C Component capacity vector43
c
{i}
x Capacity of component i in state x.44
{c{i}x }M×1 Set of current capacities of all components.45
Ei Set of attributes of component i.46
e System edge matrix.47
fl LOOP frequency.48
fs SBO frequency.49
fxy (t) Probability density function for transition50
from state x to y.51
G System graph object.52
k Number of edges/links in system graph.53
lb Set of minimum flow through edges/links.54
M Number of system nodes.55
m Number of safety buses/trains.56
N Number of Monte-Carlo samples.57
n1 Number of trains a generator can supply.58
pn SBO probability given the (n− 1)th SBO.59
ub Set of maximum flow through edges/links.60
r Number of components affected by a CCF.61
rn (t) Non-recovery probability from the nth SBO.62
S Register indicating SBO occurrence.63
s Set of source nodes.64
sj SBO indicator for the jth simulation sample.65
T Component transition matrix.66
t ID of virtual output node.67
Utm Unavailability due to test or maintenance.68
u Proportion of train demand generator satisfies.69
V Set of nodes in the system graph.70
x0 Initial component state.71
Xij Flow from node i to j.72
Xout Flow into the virtual output node.73
Y Set containing flows through all the nodes.74
Θ System inequality constraint matrix.75
Γ System incidence matrix.76
Φ System equality constraint matrix.77
Ωij Maximum flow from node i to j.78
ð Number of intermediate nodes.79
Ψ System flow objective function.80
ρ Set of components making up CCG.81
δ Number of components in CCG.82
θ Set of CCF probabilities.83
β1 Common failure mode for CCG.84
β2 State rendering CCG vulnerable to CCF.85
τ Vector of next node transition times.86
µold Vector of node capacities at last system jump.87
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I. INTRODUCTION88
NUCLEAR power is produced by harnessing in a reactor89 vessel, the heat generated from a fission reaction chain.90
The reactor vessel is placed in a concrete containment to shield91
the environment from the potential release of radioactive mate-92
rials. Core damage ensues when the core temperature exceeds93
a certain threshold or the nuclear fuel elements in the vessel94
are uncovered. This event may trigger containment breach,95
inflicting huge environmental and economic catastrophe.96
Severe accident mitigation is achieved in part by ensuring97
a reliable cooling water circulation in the reactor vessel. This98
objective, during normal plant operation, is achieved through99
heat exchange between the primary and secondary loops of100
the plant’s main cooling system. The process, however, ceases101
on plant shut down and backup cooling systems are required102
to sustain decay heat removal. Like the main cooling system,103
the backup cooling systems rely on AC power provided by104
sources outside the plant (offsite power). When these sources105
fail (Loss Of Offsite Power-LOOP), emergency sources on-106
site are started, to drive the plant’s safety systems. If the107
emergency sources are also unavailable or unable to function108
as required, the plant is said to be in a Station Blackout109
(SBO). The backup cooling systems, however, are equipped110
with alternative turbine or diesel-driven pumps to help the111
plant cope with this incident. These systems, on the downside,112
require for monitoring and control, DC power from DC113
power banks. Their sustainability, therefore, regardless of their114
inherent reliability, is limited by the DC battery depletion time.115
This time, and the boil-off rate of reactor coolant, define the116
maximum acceptable AC power recovery duration [1].117
SBO accidents are the largest contributor to nuclear power118
plant risk, accounting for over 70% of the core damage119
frequency at some plants [1], [2]. LOOP events, which initiate120
these accidents, are classified on the basis of their origin. A121
grid-centred LOOP is due to the failure of the transmission122
network outside the plant, switchyard-centred LOOP arises123
from failures in the switchyard on the plant premises, plant-124
centred LOOP is triggered by the operational dynamics of125
the plant itself, while weather-related LOOP is attributed to126
failures induced by severe and extreme weather, excluding127
lightning [1], [2]. The effective SBO risk is the sum of the128
core damage frequencies induced by the various LOOP types.129
A. Review of Existing Models130
SBO risk quantification starts with LOOP event tree anal-131
ysis [3], where the Emeregency Power System availability132
is checked in the first heading. This event failure, which133
frequency defines the SBO frequency, transfers the analysis134
to the SBO event tree [1]. In the latter, the successes of the135
various mitigating actions, including offsite power and the136
recovery of the Emergency Diesel Generators at specific times137
are also checked. These times, however, vary across plants and138
depend on the status of a plant’s mitigating systems. At the139
Maanshan nuclear power plant, for instance, power recovery140
is checked at 1, 2, 4, and 10 hours into SBO. Each top event141
probability in the SBO event tree requires one or more static142
fault trees [4]–[6] for its quantification.143
Static fault tree analysis employs an analytical approach,144
as such, it carries the important advantage of being compu-145
tationally efficient. For this reason, its sensitivity, importance,146
and uncertainty analysis capabilities are outstanding. These147
attributes explain its wide use for risk analysis in the nuclear,148
aviation [7], and chemical process industries [8]. Unfortu-149
natley, fault trees become intractable with large systems or150
moderate systems with complex interactions [8]. They often151
require a detailed knowledge of the system being modelled,152
making them both difficult to apply and error-prone. Their153
static nature also limits their applicability in many ways. For154
instance;155
i. Implementing certain types of interdependencies is either156
tedious or completely impossible.157
ii. The analyst has to assume SBO is coincident with LOOP158
and that all power recovery efforts start simultaneously159
after SBO sets in. As a consequence,160
a) The SBO frequency and non-recovery probability are161
overestimated in most cases, since the repair of a failed162
element is normally initiated immediately.163
b) For plants with multiple emergency power systems, it164
is impossible to determine which sequence of response165
minimises the SBO frequency and maximises the re-166
covery probability simultaneously.167
c) It is also difficult to investigate the effects of external168
factors like logistic problems, extreme environmental169
events, and human resource constraints on the recovery170
process.171
iii. The analyst is forced to assume the non-occurrence of172
a second SBO after power recovery. This assumption,173
however, loses its validity if the emergency sources are174
recovered first. In this case, a second failure could initiate175
another SBO sequence before offsite power recovery.176
iv. Finally, there is the problem of inconvenience due to177
repetitive modelling. Since the non-recovery probability178
is normally required for multiple instances, each would179
require a dedicated fault tree.180
There are numerous instances of remarkable attempts at181
extending the applicability of fault trees to systems with182
interdependencies and various forms of dynamic interactions183
[6], [9]. Kaiser et al. [10], for instance, introduced a state/event184
fault tree approach that translates fault-trees to Deterministic185
& Stochastic Petri Nets. Similarly, Zhou et al. [11], quite186
recently proposed an approach that converts static fault trees187
to Dynamic Uncertain Causality Graphs in order to tackle the188
dynamic and uncertainty attributes of practical engineering189
systems. However, like Kaiser’s approach [10], Zhou’s [11]190
is restricted to binary-state components and systems. Even191
though the performance of most components could be parti-192
tioned into two levels, the existence of multiple failure modes193
makes binary-state models inadequate. Also, from a modelling194
perspective, there are occasions when the analyst would need195
to model a binary-state element as a multi-state one in order196
to fully define its behaviour. Such flexibility requires a frame-197
work supporting multi-state modelling. Bobbio’s fault tree to198
Bayesian Network mapping procedure [12] effectively solves199
this problem. However, like Kaiser’s and Zhou’s approaches,200
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Bobbio’s mapping procedure is also susceptible to deficiencies201
(3) and (4) outlined above.202
Dynamic Fault Trees [13]–[16] are perhaps the closest203
researchers have come to solving the limitations of static fault204
trees. Various approaches have been proposed for their solution205
but Markov analysis [14], [15], [17] remains the most popular.206
Markov modelling, however, like static fault tree analyis,207
becomes intractable with large systems and is only applicable208
to exponentially distributed transitions. Nevertheless, state209
explosion is no longer an issue, with the introduction of210
intuitive Dynamic Fault Tree software [18], [19]. Even with211
these developments, most of the Dynamic Fault Tree solution212
approaches are susceptible to deficiencies (3) and (4) outlined213
above. These deficiencies can only be addressed by approaches214
offering the flexibility to replicate the exact behaviour of215
the system. Such an approach, however, was put forward by216
Rao et al. [16], which they used to model the power supply217
system of a nuclear power plant. The approach simulates218
a system’s Dynamic Fault Tree and addresses most of the219
limitations of static fault trees. However, like the majority of220
system reliability models, Rao’s work is only applicable to221
binary-state components. The development of a more universal222
simulation framework, therefore, is desirable.223
B. The Proposed Approach and Scope224
As evidenced in Rao’s, Rocha’s, and Lei’s works [16],225
[20], [21], Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) is flexible enough226
to model any system attribute. Its problem, however, is that227
most of the existing MCS algorithms are system-specific and228
require either the structure function, cut sets, or path sets of229
the system. An intuitive event-driven MCS procedure, offering230
multi-state component modelling opportunities has recently231
been proposed [22]. This procedure is general and does not232
require the definition of the system’s path & cut sets or233
structure function, thanks to its embedded graph model.234
In this work, the graph and multi-state models proposed235
in [22] are adopted. The graph model is used to model the236
topology of the system and allow the performance of the237
system to be directly computed from the performance of the238
components. This attribute eliminates the need for an explicit239
association of component failure combinations to the state of240
the system. The multi-state model, on the other hand, is used241
to model the behaviour of the components, overcoming the242
assumption of a perfectly binary behaviour of components. It243
is particularly useful to the multiple failure mode and dynamic244
attribute representation of the Emergency Power Systems. This245
model, for instance, could be exploited to investigate the246
effects of limited maintenance teams or the unavailability of247
spares on the Emergency Power Systems recovery [23]. We248
extend the original model to incorporate interdependencies249
by means of a dependency matrix and an efficient recursive250
algorithm to propagate the effects of failures across the system.251
Completing the framework, we propose a simple MCS algo-252
rithm that induces LOOP in the system, replicate the ensuing253
sequence of events, and monitor the availability of power at254
the various safety buses. The number of available safety buses,255
as a function of time, is computed after each system event.256
From the simulation history, any SBO index can be computed,257
thereby providing an opportunity for more insights into SBO258
risks. The multi-state component model, together with the259
dependency matrix, adequately captures and represents the260
redundancies in the emergency power system of the plant.261
Consequently, the explicit modelling of these redundancies,262
which poses a significant challenge, is eliminated.263
1) Merits & Novelty of Proposed Approach: The frame-264
work, for now, is limited to grid and switchyard induced265
LOOP, given their dominance [2]. Its preliminary results were266
first presented at the 13th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and267
Management (PSAM) conference [24]. However, this paper268
proposes several improvements. Firstly, an extensive review269
of the suitability of fault trees and their derivatives, to SBO270
analysis has been included. We have also considered the effects271
of Common-Cause Failures (CCF), unavailability due to test272
or maintenance, and human error on the SBO frequency and273
recovery probability. We also show how the results obtained274
from the framework can be absorbed in the existing model.275
Finally, we extend the number of computable SBO indices and276
consider the effects of system configuration and the sequence277
of operator response on system recovery.278
This paper is the first documented application of load-flow279
simulation to a complete SBO risk assessment. With respect280
to the existing models discussed in Section I-A, the proposed281
framework exhibits the following advantages;282
• Adequacy & Flexibility - it models realistic attributes283
of the plant’s power recovery and provides more insights284
into SBO risks. For instance, it enhances the investigation285
of the possibility of a second SBO after the first.286
• Convenience & Generality - it is convenient in the sense287
that the modeller does not need to deduce the combination288
of component failure leading to system failure. They also289
do not need to explicitly model component redundan-290
cies, as these are implicitly captured by the modelling291
framework. The modelling framework, in addition, is292
applicable to many system reliability problems.293
2) Solution Sequence: The proposed approach is applied as294
summarised by the following chronological steps;295
i. Identify the key elements of the system, define its topol-296
ogy, and derive its flow equation parameters.297
ii. Develop the multi-state model for each system element.298
iii. Model the interdependencies between the elements.299
iv. Force a LOOP event and simulate the behaviour of the300
standby power systems.301
v. Compute the SBO indices from the simulation history.302
II. STATION BLACKOUT MODELLING303
A nuclear power plant’s power system consists of the grid,304
the switchyard, the Emergency Power Systems, alternative305
Emergency Power System, and the safety buses. The Alter-306
native Emergency Power Systems are additional emergency307
sources (such as Gas Turbine Generators) available at some308
plants to boost their LOOP/SBO recovery capability. In this309
section, we show how the plant’s power system is accurately310
modelled and analysed, in line with the solution sequence311
outlined in Section I-B2.312
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A. The System Topology313
We represent the topology of the plant’s power system by314
a graph which nodes depict the components of the system.315
Connecting the nodes are perfectly reliable links portraying316
the direction of power flow. Flows from all the safety buses317
are terminated on a virtual node, introduced to represent the318
total available power. This virtual node would later be used to319
compute the non-recovery probability of AC power.320
Let the nodes of the system be numbered from 1 to M and321
represented by the set V = {1, 2, ...,M}. Since the links are322
perfectly reliable, the adjacency matrix, A, of the system is323
defined as;324
A = {aij}M×M | aij =
{
1 If flow is i→ j
0 Otherwise
(1)
The topology of the system, therefore, can be defined by325
G | G = (V,A). Using the parameters of G only, the flow326
equations of the system can be derived [22]. These equations327
can then be used in synergy with the current state properties328
of the system nodes to deduce the performance of the system.329
For this, a linear programming algorithm is employed, given330
the possibility of flow redirection and the need to satisfy331
the capacity constraints of the nodes and their links. The332
objective is to find the flow across each link of the system333
that maximizes the flow into the virtual node. If Xij is the334
flow across the link between nodes i and j and given there335
are k such links for all (i, j) ∈ e, where e is the edge matrix of336
the system as defined in [22], the linear programming problem337
is formulated by (2), (5), (7), and (8).338
Θ{Xij}k×1 ≤ {c{i}x }M×1 | (i, j) ∈ e, ∀i ∈ V (2)
Equation (2) expresses the inequality constraints to be satis-339
fied, where c{i}x denotes the capacity of node i when residing340
in state x. {c{i}x }M×1, therefore, is the vector of current341
capacities of all the nodes of the system. The inequality matrix,342
Θ, is related to the incidence matrix, Γ, as follows,343
Θ = {θiq}M×k | θiq =
{
1, γiq 6= 0
0, otherwise
(3)
344
Γ = {γpq}M×k | γpq =

1, p = i
−1, p = j
0, otherwise
(4)
Γ is related to A by (4), where q = 1, 2, ..., k (the edge345
number) is the index of the edge between nodes i and j in e346
and p = 1, 2, ...,M .347
Φ{Xij}k×1 = {0}ð×1 ∀(i, j) ∈ e (5)
Equation (5) expresses the equality constraint to be satisfied,348
where Φ and Γ are related thus;349
Φ = {φλq}ð×k | φλq = γpq
λ = 1, 2, ...,ð | ð < M f : λ→ p ∀p ∈ (s ∪ t)′ (6)
ð is the number of intermediate nodes, s is the set of source350
nodes, which comprises the grid and standby power systems351
while t is the virtual node representing the total output of the352
system. If the intermediate nodes of the system (i.e., nodes353
not in s and t) are arranged in ascending order of their ID, (6)354
suggests the λth row of Φ is identical to the pth row of Γ,355
where p is the λth element of the ordered set of intermediate356
nodes. In other words, Φ is a sub matrix of Γ, containing all357
the rows of the latter corresponding to intermediate nodes.358
lb = {0}k×1, ub = {Ωij}k×1
Ωij = min{c{i}max, c{j}max} ∀(i, j) ∈ e
(7)
Equation (7) defines the lower and upper bound vectors, lb and359
ub, of the flow through the links, where c{i}max is the maximum360
capacity of node i. Finally, the objective function of the linear361
programming problem is expressed in (8).362
Ψ = −{ψq}1×k{Xij}k×1 | ψq =
∑
i∈s
γiq (8)
Following the termination of the linear programming algo-363
rithm, the vector of flow, Y, through the nodes of the system364
is given by ΘM×k{Xij}k×1. The total output, therefore, is365
given by the tth element, (Y, t), of Y. Interestingly, all the366
parameters, but {c{i}x }M×1, required to compute Y remain367
static during system simulation. The main task, therefore, is to368
update {c{i}x }M×1 after each system event. The derivation of369
(2) to (8) is outside the scope of this paper, interested readers370
are referred to [22]. However, an illustrative example of the371
linear programming problem formulation is provided in the372
Appendix to this paper.
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Fig. 1. Multi-state model for Grid and Switchyard nodes
373
B. The System Components374
Each component is defined by a multi-state model that375
takes into account the various parameters that characterise its376
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Fig. 2. Multi-state models for Emergency Diesel and Gas Turbine Generators without human error consideration
operation. Let Ei denote component i, then,377
Ei = (T,C, x0) (9)
378
T = {Txy}n×n | x 6= y (x, y) ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
Txy =

∞, If x→ y is a forced transition
0, If no transition between states x & y
fxy(t), Otherwise
(10)
Where T is the transition matrix of the component; C |379
C = {cx}1×n, its capacity vector; x0, its initial state; cx,380
its capacity in state x; n, its number of states; and fxy(t), the381
probability density function characterizing the transition from382
state x to y. T contains the density function objects for all the383
transitions depicted in the multi-state model of the component384
and C defines the capacity of the component in each state.385
Each state capacity is expressed as a non-dimensional386
number defining the proportion of total system output the387
node can supply or transmit whilst residing in that state. If388
m is the total number of power trains at the plant, n1, the389
number of power trains the node simultaneously supplies, u,390
the proportion of power train demand it can satisfy, then, its391
capacity when working perfectly is, n1um−1. It expresses392
the total system output as a fraction of the number of power393
trains/safety buses present at the plant. On this note, the grid394
and switchyard nodes are each assigned unity capacity when395
available and 0, otherwise. The virtual output node has a fixed396
capacity of 1 and each safety bus, a fixed capacity of m−1.397
1) Modelling the Grid and Switchyard: The grid is mod-398
elled as a 2-state node; ‘Working’, when available and ‘Failed’,399
otherwise. Though grid failures are mostly random, we model400
them as forced transitions [23], since they already are incor-401
porated in the LOOP frequency. Most often, plants tap their402
AC power from multiple offsite sources, and grid failure is403
defined as the failure of all of these sources. The repair of404
at least one of the failed sources, however, is sufficient to405
achieve grid recovery. For this reason, the transition from406
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Fig. 3. Multi-state model for switchyard with human error consideration
‘Failed’ to ‘Working’ is defined by the upper bound of the407
envelope around the cumulative density functions (cdf) of the408
individual source repair distributions. Given this, sampling409
the grid recovery time entails generating a uniform random410
number and reading off its corresponding time from the411
envelope cdf, interpolating where necessary. An important412
point to note is, this approach slightly underestimates the grid413
recovery probability, as it assumes the individual source repair414
actions are initiated concurrently. In practice, the sources do415
not necessarily fail simultaneously and their recovery actions416
may commence at different times. This implies, by the time417
the last source fails, the restoration of already failed sources418
would have begun. The actual grid recovery time, therefore,419
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Fig. 4. Multi-state models for Emergency Diesel and Gas Turbine Generators with human error consideration
is less than that given by the envelope cdf. This, however, is420
acceptable, as the goal in risk management is to ensure risk421
levels are acceptable, even in worst case scenarios.422
Similarly, normal switchyard operation is defined by a 2-423
state node. In cases where the plant is enhanced with multiple424
switchyards, switchyard recovery is treated as in the case of425
multiple grid sources. Fig. 1 shows the multi-state model for426
the Grid and Switchyard.427
2) Modelling the Standby Power Systems: The Emergency428
Power System is constituted by the Emergency Diesel Gen-429
erators (EDG), and in this work, Gas Turbine Generators430
(GTG) constitute the Alternative Emergency Power System.431
In this section, we model only the multi-state behaviour of432
the standby power systems, and the effects of redundancies433
on their operation is considered in a latter section. We make434
the following assumptions in developing these models;435
i. The initiation of test/maintenance is coincident with436
LOOP, and at any instance, there is not more than one437
source in test or maintenance.438
ii. Sources in test or maintenance remain unavailable439
through the sequence.440
iii. Repairs are commenced immediately.441
iv. A generator just from maintenance cannot fail to start.442
This implies a perfect maintenance scenario.443
The Alternative Emergency Power System recovery is assumed444
offsite power recovery in [24]. This assumption is on the445
premise that their failure is included in the LOOP frequency.446
However, the assumption is impractical, given they are mostly447
a standby source. We, therefore, modify their multi-state model448
to include running failures, rendering them an on-site source.449
We consider failure-to-start and failure-to-run as the only450
failure modes an Emergency Diesel Generator is susceptible451
to. Failure-to-start refers to the Emergency Diesel Generator452
failure to start from cold-standby and failure-to-run denotes453
its failure to function for the duration of the LOOP. While454
the former is defined by a crisp probability, the latter is455
characterised by a time-to-failure probability density function.456
However, the Standardised Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model457
[1] considers a third Emergency Diesel Generator failure458
mode, failure-to-load, defining the case when the Emergency459
Diesel Generator starts but cannot power the load. This failure460
mode is considered failure-to-start, in the proposed framework.461
We introduce two additional states, ‘Working’ and ‘TM’, as462
shown in Fig. 2, to account for the perfect operation of463
the Emergency Diesel Generator and its unavailability due464
to test or maintenance, respectively. Except otherwise, the465
transition from cold standby to working is instantaneous,466
whilst the transition from cold standby to failure or TM is467
also instantaneous but conditional. Conditional transitions are468
a special type of forced transition depending on a probabilistic469
event that is external to the component and with a known470
likelihood [23]. Conditional and forced transitions have the471
same representation in the transition matrix of the component472
(see (10)).473
The Gas Turbine Generators behave in almost the same way474
as the Emergency Diesel Generators, save for the difference475
in their start-up and manual alignment times. For this, a start-476
up state is inserted between their cold-standby and working477
states, as shown in Fig. 2. Whilst in start-up, they could fail,478
explaining the transition from start-up to failure.479
3) Accounting for Human Error: Human error is very480
important in the risk assessment of engineering systems. In481
SBO recovery, human errors mostly manifest themselves as482
delayed response to a certain SBO mitigation action. For483
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instance, the switchyard is forced into a temporary shut down484
state during grid failures. On grid recovery, the plant personnel485
manually initiate its restoration, which process is susceptible486
to human-induced delays. Accounting for these delays, two487
additional states are introduced in the 2-state model discussed488
in Section II-B1, as shown in Fig. 3. The transitions from489
‘Working’ to ‘Shutdown’ and from ‘Shutdown’ to ‘Delay’490
(D), are influenced by grid failure and recovery respectively.491
‘Shutdown’ denotes grid recovery-in-progress, while ‘Delay’492
represents switching-in-progress. The latter determines the493
difference between the potential and actual bus recovery times.494
If this difference is negligible or the potential, instead of the495
actual bus recovery time is required, the model in Fig. 1 is496
retained.497
Similarly, the Gas Turbine Generator and some Emergency498
Diesel Generators require manual start-up and alignment, this499
is the case for shared diesel generators. A generator is said500
to be shared if it can substitute several units but, however,501
can only replace one unit at a given instance. Therefore, in502
the case of sequential multiple unit failures, only the first unit503
is replaced. For simultaneous failures, any of the units can504
be replaced, since they normally are identical. Since these505
replacements are manually executed, they are susceptible to506
delays, contrary to what most models suggest. Fig. 2, for507
instance, assumes the transition from cold standby to the508
fully functional or failure state to be instantaneous. This, by509
extension, implies, any maintenance action (if the generator510
fails to start) is initiated at once. However, with human error,511
the start-up procedure may be initiated latter than scheduled.512
We, therefore, introduce two states, one each, between cold513
standby & working and failure & cold standby, as shown in514
Fig. 4, to account for these delays. We have assumed the plant515
personnel to be well trained, experienced, and fit to perform516
their assigned tasks as expected. Consequently, the possibility517
of inappropriately executed actions is ignored.518
Transitions 6 → 1 with 4 → 7 and transition 7 → 4 with519
5 → 8, of Fig. 4, account for human error in the recovery520
of manually operated Emergency Diesel and Gas Turbine521
Generators respectively. In practical applications, human error522
is expressed in terms of the probability of not completing523
a given action within a specified time. If this probability is524
known for multiple times, a cdf could be fitted through the525
points. For this, we recommend the Weibull distribution, since526
it can yield a wide range of distributions. Recall the cdf of527
a Weibull distribution is 1 − e−(t/a)b , where a and b are528
its scale and shape parameters respectively. Given the human529
error probabilities are the likelihoods of inaction, they define530
the complement of the human reaction time cdf. Therefore,531
the Weibull parameters, a and b, are obtained by fitting the532
set of probability values to the function e−(t/a)
b
.533
C. Modelling Component Interdependencies534
To ensure resilience, system designers often employ multi-535
ple layers of defence, either in the form of redundancies or536
shared components. This proactive strategy inadvertently intro-537
duces interdependencies in the system, resulting in modelling538
accuracy issues. We define interdependency in a more general539
sense as the potential for a state change in one element to540
trigger a state change in another. We propose two models,541
the Common-Cause Failure (CCF) and the cascading failure542
models, to implement these interdependencies.543
1) The CCF Model: This model is used when the random544
failure of any member of a group of similar components,545
performing the same task could cause the failure of one or546
more of the remaining components [25]. Such a group of547
components is called a Common-Cause Group (CCG), and548
its key attributes are;549
• There is a set of probabilities associated with the number550
of components involved in any random failure event. Let551
this set of probabilities be defined by θ | θ = {θr}δ ,552
where r is the number of components affected by the553
failure event, δ, the total number of components in the554
group, and
∑δ
r=1 θr = 1.555
• All the components in the CCG fail in the same mode.556
Implying, the CCG for start-up failures cannot influence557
the CCG for running failures, for instance.558
Each CCG, therefore, is defined by the quadruple,559
(ρ, β1, β2,θ). Where, ρ is the set of components in the CCG,560
β1, the common failure mode, and β2, the state the components561
have to be in to be susceptible to this failure mode. The562
algorithm for propagating CCF is summarised thus;563
i. When a component fails, check if its new state matches564
β1 for its CCG.565
ii. Go to step (v) if there is no match. Else, determine the566
number of components, r, that will fail.567
iii. Go to step (v) if r = 1. Else, remove from ρ, the com-568
ponent initiating the failure event. From the remainder,569
randomly select r − 1 components.570
iv. For each component selected in step (iii), check if its571
current state matches β2 and set this to β1.572
v. End procedure.573
The procedure above requires θ to be in conformity with the α-574
Factor model [25]. CCF probabilities expressed in the Multiple575
Greek Letter model would need to be converted as in [25].576
2) The Cascading Failure Model: This model is used for577
interdependencies not satisfying the CCF criteria. For instance,578
the redundancies among the standby power systems and the579
dependence of the latter on the grid and switchyard. An580
important assumption invoked in this model, however, is that581
on occurrence of the trigger event, the dependent event occurs582
immediately.583
Initially proposed in [26], the model defines interdependen-584
cies by a dependency matrix. The dependency matrix, Di, for585
node i, defines the effects of the node’s state transition on586
other nodes. It takes the form, Di = {dj1, dj2, dj3, dj4}v×4 |587
j = 1, 2, ..., v− 1, v, where dj1 is the state of i triggering the588
event, dj2, the affected node, dj3, the state the node has to589
be in to be vulnerable, and dj4, its target state after the event.590
Each row of Di defines the behaviour of an affected node,591
and v, the number of relationships. For example, consider a 2-592
component system, with each component existing in 3 possible593
distinct states. When component 1 makes a transition to state594
3, component 2 is forced to make a transition to state 2 as595
well, if and only if the latter is currently residing in state 1.596
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Since component 1 is the trigger component in this case, the597
interdependency is defined by D1 as,598
D1 =
(
3 2 1 2
)
(11)
Let a third 3-state component be added to the system. In599
addition to its effect on component 2, let the transition of600
component 1 also affect component 3, such that the latter is601
forced to state 1 if it is in state 3 at the time of the trigger602
event. To represent the overall behaviour of component 1, D1603
is updated as shown in (12), to reflect the new information.604
D1 =
(
3 2 1 2
3 3 3 1
)
(12)
(12) shows that each row of the dependency matrix represents605
a possible outcome.606
Occasionally, a state change in a node can only affect607
another node if a third node is in a certain state. This type608
of dependency is known as a joint dependency, and it is609
outside the scope of the initial model in [26]. We introduce610
the joint dependency matrix, D′ = {d′j1, d′j2, d′j3, d′j4}v×4, to611
resolve this problem. Element d′j1 defines the state the third612
node must be in to satisfy the joint dependency while d′j2,613
d′j3, and d
′
j4 have the same meaning as dj2, dj3, and dj4614
respectively. Assuming a certain state change in node i only615
affects, say node x, if node ω is in state σ, Di defines the616
relationship between nodes i and ω, while D′ω defines the617
relationship between ω and x. Nodes i, ω, and x are the trigger,618
intermediate, and target nodes respectively. The intermediate619
node does not undergo a state change, meaning its target state620
is the same as its vulnerable state. Therefore, in Di, the 3rd621
and 4th elements of the row corresponding to the intermediate622
node are equal. Given j = 1, for Di, d12 = ω, d13 = d14 = σ623
and for D′ω , d′11 = σ, d′12 = x. The remaining elements retain624
their meaning, as defined earlier. Let, for illustrative purposes,625
the dependency between components 1 and 3 (second row of626
D1 in (12)) only hold if component 2 is in state 2.627
D1 =
(
3 2 1 2
3 2 2 2
)
D′2 =
(
2 3 3 1
)
(13)
To represent this attribute, the second row of D1 is modified628
to reflect the relationship between components 1 and 2, and629
the relationship between components 2 and 3, defined by D′2630
as shown in (13). Notice D′2, instead of D2, has been used,631
since the relationship between components 2 and 3 is due to632
a joint dependency with another component.633
The dependency and joint dependency matrices, indeed, can
be used to represent a wide range of dependencies. However,
there are a few instances that may result in large matrices. Such
cases require an intuitive manipulation, to keep the matrix size
moderate and prevent modelling error. We introduce a negative
sign in front of the trigger or vulnerable state to signify that
the dependency is satisfied only if the component is not in
that state. This notation is analogous to the NOT-gate in fault
trees. For instance, if component 1, in the scenario above,
can affect component 3 only if component 2 is in states 2
or 1, it is efficient to exploit the NOT notation, instead of
inserting an additional row in each of D1 and D′2. Recalling
that component 2 has 3 states, state 2 OR state 1 is logically
equivalent to NOT state 3. Hence, the dependency matrices,
D1 and D′2, become,
D1 =
(
3 2 1 2
3 2 −3 −3
)
D′2 =
( −3 3 3 1 )
634
We propose a recursive algorithm to implement the depen-635
dency matrices. If xi denotes the new/current state of node i,636
the algorithm is summarised thus;637
i. Define a register, R, to hold the affected components,638
their vulnerable, and target states.639
ii. Using Di and xi , find all components affected by the640
state change and update R with elements 2 to 4 of the641
rows representing the components.642
iii. Select the last row of R and check if its last two elements643
are equal. This row defines the dependency induced in644
component ω by component i.645
iv. If the response to the query in step (iii) is in the646
affirmative, designate the equal elements, , delete the647
last row of R, and;648
a) Using ω, D′ω , and xω as inputs, call steps (i) to (vii),649
noting that a row in D′ω is affected by the state change650
only if its first element is .651
b) Continue from step (iii).652
Else, proceed to step (v).653
v. Force the designated transition as determined in step (iii)654
and delete the last row of R. If the affected node is in655
standby, and its target state, Working, Delay, or Start-Up,656
initiate its start-up procedure.657
vi. If Dω exists, repeat steps (ii) to (vi), replacing Di and xi658
with Dω and xω respectively.659
vii. Repeat steps (iii) to (vi) until R is empty, and terminate660
the procedure.661
III. SYSTEM SIMULATION & ANALYSIS662
The system’s operation is imitated by generating random663
failure events of components and their corresponding re-664
pairs. For every component transition, the capacity vector,665
{c{i}x }M×1, of the system is updated and used to deduce the666
flow, (Y, t), through the output node. At time t = 0, the grid667
and switchyard nodes are in operation, while the Emergency668
Power Systems and Alternative Emergency Power Systems are669
in cold standby. LOOP is initiated by setting the grid (for670
grid centred LOOP) or the switchyard (for switchyard centred671
LOOP) to its failure state. The next transition parameters672
of the standby systems are sampled, and the simulation is673
moved to the earliest transition time, t. Components with674
next transition time equal to t are identified, the required675
transitions effected, their next transition times sampled, the676
new system performance computed, and the next simulation677
time determined. This cycle of events continues until offsite678
power is recovered.679
Let µold hold the node capacities at the previous system680
transition, τ , the vector of next node transition times, N , the681
number of simulation samples, and S = {sj}N , the register682
indicating the occurrence of an SBO. The indicator register, S,683
is such that, sj = 1 if an SBO occurs in the jth sample, and684
0, otherwise. The simulation algorithm is summarised thus;685
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Fig. 5. An excerpt from the SBO event tree showing headings (credit: [1])
i. Initialize the register storing the flow through the output686
node, set N = 1, S = {}, and define the simulation687
stopping criterion. The stopping criterion could be the688
number of LOOP, number of SBO, or convergence of the689
SBO probability.690
ii. Determine which component will be unavailable due to691
test or maintenance.692
iii. Set sN = 0 and τ = {∞}M , where M is the number of693
nodes in the system.694
iv. Force LOOP as described earlier, accounting for in-695
terdependencies according to the procedures described696
in Sections II-C1 and II-C2. Remember to sample the697
next transition parameters after every node transition and698
update τ . See [22] for the procedure for sampling the699
transition parameters of a multi-state node.700
v. Define µ using the current states of the nodes, that is,701
µ = {c{i}x0 }M×1 and set t = 0, µold = µ.702
vi. Determine Xout | Xout = (Y, t) and save as a function703
of time.704
vii. Set sN = sN + 1 if Xout = 0 and determine the next705
simulation time, t = min (τ ).706
viii. Find nodes with next transition time equal to t. For707
each node, force the required transition, sample its next708
transition parameters (except for nodes returning to cold709
standby), and update µ & τ .710
ix. Restart nodes returning from repairs if Xout, as previ-711
ously determined, is less than 1.712
x. If µold 6= µ;713
a) Compute Xout and set sN = sN + 1 if Xout = 0.714
b) Save Xout if different from the previous.715
c) Temporarily set the capacity of the switchyard node to716
1 if it is in ‘Shutdown’ and calculate the new system717
flow. If this flow is non-zero, set the switchyard to start-718
up, sample its next transition parameters, and update719
τ .720
xi. Set µold = µ, t = min (τ ) , and check if offsite power721
is recovered.722
xii. Repeat steps (viii) to (xi) until offsite power is recovered.723
Discard history N if sN = 0 and set N = N + 1.724
xiii. Repeat steps (ii) to (xii) until the simulation stopping725
criterion is met, and terminate algorithm.726
xiv. Compute the relevant SBO indices727
A. SBO Indices: Computation & Relevance728
The SBO frequency, fs, makes the list of the most informa-729
tive and desired SBO indices. It defines the expected number730
of times, per year, an SBO occurs at a plant. If p1 defines the731
conditional probability of an SBO given a LOOP occurring at732
frequency, fl, per year, then,733
fs = p1fl
p1 =
∑
(S > 0)
N − 1
(14)
The fraction of fs occurring at start-up is deduced from the734
number of SBO at time 0. This index could be used to735
assess the efficiency of the start-up procedure, as well as the736
vulnerability of the generators in cold standby.737
The non-recovery probability, r1 (t), defines the likelihood738
of recovery duration from an SBO accident exceeding a given739
time. It is computed as detailed in [26], and like p1, belongs740
to the set of inputs to the SBO event tree. Given it defines the741
unavailability of power at the plant, r1 (t) can be directly com-742
pared with the reliability of the SBO mitigating mechanism.743
The outcome of such a comparison would help ascertain the744
adequacy of the mitigating mechanism. In addition, fs×r1 (t)745
yields the frequency of exceedance, a measure of the overall746
SBO risk at the plant. The quantity also presents a means747
of assessing the relative effectiveness of multiple recovery748
responses or operational constraints.749
Finally, the conditional probability of a second SBO, p2,750
given an SBO has already occurred is given by,751
p2 =
∑
(S > 1)∑
(S > 0)
(15)
Knowledge of p2 may shape the recovery response on the752
occurrence of a second SBO. For instance, a plant with a753
large p2 would require the logistics used in the recovery of754
the first SBO left in the field and the operations staff kept on755
high alert. This reduces human error, ensuring a lower non-756
recovery probability, r2(t), of the second SBO.757
Generally, the conditional probability, pn, of the nth SBO758
given the (n− 1)th SBO is expressed as,759
pn =
∑
(S > n− 1)∑
(S > n− 2) (16)
If absolute probabilities are required instead, the denominator760
in (16) is replaced with N − 1.761
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Fig. 6. Layout of the Maanshan nuclear power plant AC distribution system (credit: Dr Shih-Kuei Chen, NTHU, Taiwan)
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Fig. 7. Simplified schematic of plant’s AC distribution system
B. Incorporation into the Existing Framework762
Shown in Fig. 5 is an excerpt from the SBO event tree763
presented in [1]. Of its 12 headings, only four; T(PG), EM,764
ER1, and ER2 are of relevance to SBO recovery. The first765
depicts LOOP, and requires the LOOP frequency. The second766
represents SBO occurrence, and requires the unavailability of767
the standby power systems. Here, the chain of complicated768
fault trees in the existing model can be replaced with the con-769
ditional SBO probability, p1. The last two headings represent770
offsite and standby power recovery respectively. These can be771
merged into one heading, say AC power recovery, and the772
complicated fault trees replaced with a crisp value read from773
r1 (t). With these, the core damage frequency induced by the774
first SBO is computed by solving the event tree, using standard775
procedure. For the second SBO, the first is regarded the776
initiating event. The LOOP frequency, therefore, is replaced777
with fs, p1 with p2, and r1 (t) with r2(t).778
IV. CASE STUDY: AN APPLICATION TO THE MAANSHAN779
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN TAIWAN780
The Maanshan plant is a two-unit, 1902 MW, Westinghouse781
PWR nuclear power plant operated by the Taiwan Power782
Company. Its offsite power is supplied by six independent783
sources, four of which are connected to the 345 kV switchyard784
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Fig. 9. Multi-state model for the shared diesel generator (DG-5)
and the remainder, through the 161 kV switchyard. It is785
powered through two safety buses, AIE-PB-S01 and BIE-786
PB-S01, each with a dedicated Emergency Diesel Generator;787
DG-A and DG-B, respectively. A shared Emergency Diesel788
Generator, DG-5, connected as shown in Fig. 6 is available as789
backup in case any of the dedicated generators is unavailable.790
In addition to the shared Emergency Diesel Generators, are791
two Gas Turbine Generators, GT1 and GT2, connected via792
the 161kV switchyard. These generators form the Alternative793
Emergency Power System of the plant, each satisfying the794
demand on both power trains.795
During normal plant operation, the safety buses are fed796
by the main plant generator, G1, via the red lines and the797
normally closed breakers 19 & 01. On plant shut down, G1798
becomes unavailable, and the safety buses are forced to tap799
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Fig. 10. Multi-state model for the Gas Turbine Generators (GT1 & GT2)
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Fig. 11. Full system graph model showing maximum flow along links
power from the 345kV switchyard (via the black lines and the800
normally open breakers 17 & 03) or the 161kV switchyard801
(via the green lines and the normally open breakers 15 & 05).802
When these sources also become unavailable, DG-A and DG-803
B are automatically started and aligned. DG-5 is manually804
started and aligned by the plant operators on the failure of805
any of these. The manual start-up and alignment procedure806
of GT1 and GT2 is initiated when at least 2 out of the 3807
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TABLE I
HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITIES FOR GT1 & GT2
Time (h) 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 10
Probability 2.07× 10−1 2.07× 10−2 3× 10−3 3× 10−4 2× 10−4 1× 10−4 1× 10−5 1× 10−5
TABLE II
COMPONENT RELIABILITY DATA
Component Transition Distribution Utm
CCF Parameters
Type Parameters Start-up Failure Running Failure
DG-A & DG-B
1-2 Weibull (100,1.24)
0.009 {0.979, 0.021} {0.972, 0.028}2-3 Lognormal (6.42,2)
4-3 Lognormal (5,1.2)
GT1 &GT2
4-1 deterministic 0.5
0.0099 {0.959, 0.041} {0.962, 0.038}
4-2 Weibull (200,1.5)
2-3 Lognormal (5,2)
8-3 Lognormal (7,1.8)
1-2 Weibull (100,1.05)
7-4 Weibull (0.2872,0.8194)
5-8 Weibull (0.2872,0.8194)
DG-5
1-2 Weibull (100,1.24)
2-3 Lognormal (6.42,2)
7-3 Lognormal (5,1.2)
6-1 Weibull (0.197,0.7467)
4-7 Weibull (0.197,0.7467)
Switchyard 4-1 Weibull (0.197,0.7467)2-1 See Fig. 13
Grid 2-1 See Fig. 12
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Fig. 12. Effective repair cdf for multiple grid sources
Emergency Diesel Generators become unavailable. Following808
their successful start-up, the gas turbine generators take about809
30 minutes to become fully functional.810
A probabilistic assessment of the SBO risk of the plant due811
to grid and switchyard initiated LOOP is required.812
A. Developing the System and Component Models813
Fig. 7 is the simplified schematic of the plant’s AC power814
system, showing all the elements relevant to an SBO. DG-5,815
though serving only one bus at a time, is assumed connected816
to both buses in the system’s adjacency matrix. This implies,817
its flow is divided between the buses, contrary to what obtains818
in reality. However, since the flows from the two buses are819
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Fig. 13. Effective repair cdf for multiple switchyard nodes
emptied into the virtual output node, t, the total flow from820
the shared generator is accounted for. As shown, the six821
grid sources and the two switchyard sources have each been822
represented by single nodes, as proposed in Section II-B1.823
Nodes 1, 7, 8, and 9 are modelled as proposed in Sections824
II-B and II-B1. The switchyard, on the other hand, is modelled825
according to Fig. 3, to account for human error during its826
start-up from shut down. Since DG-A (node 5) and DG-B827
(node 6) are automatically started following a LOOP, they are828
not susceptible to human error, and, therefore are modelled829
as shown in Fig. 8. DG-5, GT1, and GT2, however, require830
human intervention for their start-up and alignment. Node 10,831
therefore, is modelled according to Fig. 9 and nodes 3 and 4,832
according to Fig. 10.833
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TABLE III
COMMON-CAUSE GROUP DEFINITION
CCG Description AttributesDesignation Value
1 Emergency Diesel Generator failure to start
ρ {5, 6}
θ {0.979, 0.021}
β1 4
β2 3
2 Emergency Diesel Generator failure to run
ρ {5, 6}
θ {0.972, 0.028}
β1 2
β2 1
3 Gas Turbine Generator failure to start
ρ {3, 4}
θ {0.959, 0.041}
β1 4
β2 3
4 Gas Turbine Generator failure to run
ρ {3, 4}
θ {0.962, 0.038}
β1 2
β2 {1, 4}
Justifying the values assigned to the state capacities of the
generators, recall the system consists of 2 safety buses (m = 2)
with each of DG-A and DG-B serving only one bus at a time
(n1 = 1). Since these generators can, however, fully meet the
demand on the bus they serve (u = 1), they are assigned a
capacity of 0.5 when working, as proposed in Section II-B.
The Gas Turbine Generators, on the other hand, can fully
serve both buses simultaneously (n1 = 2), and therefore,
have a capacity of 1 when working. From the multi-state
models, the capacity vector for the main diesel generators,
the shared diesel generator, and the gas turbine generators are
{0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, and {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
respectively. Using these parameters in conjunction with Fig.
7, the adjacency matrix of the system is derived as;
A =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0

Given the adjacency matrix, the other parameters of the system834
flow equations are obtained as described in Section II-A, where835
s = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10} and t = 9. Fig. 11 is the system’s graph836
model showing the maximum flow along each link, derived837
from the adjacency matrix and the maximum node capacities.838
Component Reliability Data: Though realistic, the data used839
do not represent the actual data for the Maanshan plant.840
They were, however, assumed with the view to reflecting the841
reliability data used in Volumes 1 and 2 of the NUREG/CR-842
6890 report (see [1], [2]).843
The repair times for the six grid sources are lognor-844
mally distributed with means and corresponding standard de-845
viations defined by {8.99, 11.84, 8.24, 10.25, 9.61, 9.15} and846
{6.71, 4.83, 4.05, 6.61, 1.92, 5} respectively. Similarly, switch-847
yard repair times are lognormally distributed, with {8, 10.41}848
and {5.83, 2.5} respectively being the sets of means and849
corresponding standard deviations for the two switchyards.850
The effective repair distributions for the grid and switchyard851
nodes are modelled according to the proposal in Section II-B1,852
as shown in Figs. 12 and 13, respectively.853
All five standby generators are assumed to have a start-854
up failure probability of 1.756 × 10−2. Also, the human855
errors associated with the failure to complete the start-up856
procedures for GT-5 and the switchyard are assumed equal857
but one-sixth of those for GT1 and GT2. Table I defines858
the probability of the operators not completing the start-859
up of the Gas Turbine Generators within selected times.860
Using the procedure proposed in Section II-B3, the parameters861
defining transitions 7 → 4 and 5 → 8 of the Gas Turbine862
Generators were obtained. The same procedure was used to863
obtain the parameters for transitions 6 → 1 and 4 → 7 of864
DG-5 and transition 4 → 1 of the switchyard. These and865
the parameters for the remaining transitions are presented in866
Table II. The column, Utm, defines the unavailability due867
to test/maintenance of the generators. The CCF parameters868
are defined by a set in which each element represents the869
probability of a certain number of components being involved870
in any failure event initiated by the component. The number of871
components is determined by the index of the element in the872
set. For instance, from the Table, the probability that the start-873
up failure of any of the main diesel generators leads to the874
failure of the other generator is 0.021. This implies a total of875
two component failures, explaining why the probability value876
is the second element of the set (see Section II-C1 for details).877
Transition 4→ 1 of the Gas Turbine Generators depicts their878
start-up duration, which as we are told in Section IV, takes879
30 minutes, explaining why it is assigned a deterministic 0.5880
hours.881
B. Representing Component Interdependencies882
The first and easily recognizable form of interdependency883
in the system is CCF, where the failure of a generator could884
trigger the almost instantaneous failure of another generator.885
This type of interdependency is modelled according to the886
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CCF model presented in Section II-C1. DG-A and DG-B,887
as we know, are of the same design and model, different888
from the make of DG-5. Therefore, while the former are889
susceptible to CCF, DG-5 is immune. Similarly, GT1 and890
GT2 are susceptible to CCF, giving rise to four common-891
cause groups, as defined in Table III. The Table is developed892
from the CCF parameters in Table II in conjunction with the893
CCF model proposed in Section II-C1. CCG 1, for instance,894
represents the CCF due to the start-up failure of any of the895
main diesel generators. Since these generators are denoted as896
nodes 5 and 6 in the system, ρ, the set of of components in the897
CCG is defined as {5, 6}. Now, as shown in Fig. 8, the start-up898
failure of DG-A or DG-B is denoted by state 4. Also, the other899
generator could only be affected by this event if it is in cold900
standby (state 3) at the time of occurrence. This explains why901
β1 and β2 are assigned the values, 4 and 3, respectively. The902
parameters for CCG 2 to 4 are derived in a similar fashion.903
The other form of interdependency, like the grid failure ne-904
cessitating the start-up of the standby generators or the failure905
of GT-5 forcing the start-up of the gas turbine generators, is906
a little more subtle and difficult to deduce. It requires a good907
knowledge of the operating principle of the system and cannot908
be modelled by the CCF model. For this, the cascading failure909
model proposed in Section II-C2 is invoked. To ensure the910
reproducibility of the case study, the step-by-step procedure911
for developing the dependency matrices, have been shown by912
recreating the sequence of events following a LOOP.913
i. Let’s assume the occurrence of the initiating event914
(LOOP), due to the failure of the grid (node 1). As already915
stated at the beginning of Section IV, the main diesel916
generators, A (node 5) and B (node 6), are restarted917
from cold standby. This is accounted for by the first 2918
rows of the dependency matrix, D1. However, if the main919
generators are not in cold standby, maybe920
D1 = D2 =

2 5 3 1
2 6 3 1
2 5 −3 −3
2 6 −3 −3

D′5 = D
′
6 =
( −3 10 3 6
−3 10 −3 −3
)
D′10 =
( −3 3 3 7
−3 4 3 7
)
(17)
due to test/maintenance or failure, the shared standby921
generator, DG-5 (node 10), is restarted. Recalling the922
concept of joint dependency discussed in Section II-C2,923
the joint dependency between the grid and DG-5 can be924
deduced. Here, the main generators are the intermediate925
nodes, since they dictate whether or not to start the shared926
generator. This behaviour is jointly represented by the last927
two rows of D1 and the first row of D′5 in (17). Again,928
if the shared generator too is unavailable (i.e., it is not929
in cold standby), the gas turbine generators, GT1 (node930
3) and GT2 (node 4), are restarted (see Fig. 10). This931
attribute is jointly represented by D′10 and the last row932
of D′5. If, however, the gas turbine generators are not in933
cold standby on arrival of their start-up signal, no action934
is taken. This is due to the fact that the signal signifies the935
unavailability of all the standby sources at the plant. D′5936
and D′6 are equal because nodes 5 and 6 produce the same937
effect on the shared generator when unavailable for start-938
up. Similarly, D1 and D2 are equal, as the response of939
the standby systems is the same for grid and switchyard940
failures.941
D5 =

2 6 3 1
4 6 3 1
2 6 −3 −3
4 6 −3 −3
 (18)
ii. DG-A (node 5) fails to start or starts but fails to run (see942
Fig. 2). The system will first check if DG-B (node 6) is943
available for start-up and initiate its start up, if available.944
This behaviour is defined by the first two rows of D5, as945
shown in (18). The effect of the unavailability of DG-B946
on arrival of its start-up signal has already been defined in947
scenario (i) (see the last row of D1). This representation948
is adapted to account for the case when DG-A fails to949
start or run and DG-B is unavailable for start-up, in the950
last two rows of D5 (see (18)).951
D6 =

2 5 3 1
4 5 3 1
2 5 −3 −3
4 5 −3 −3
 (19)
iii. Similarly, DG-B (node 6) fails to start or starts but fails952
to run (see Fig. 8). The system will first check if DG-953
A (node 5) is available, and initiate its start-up. The954
ensuing sequence of events is similar to that in scenario955
(ii). Hence, the dependency matrix is as obtained in (19).956
iv. DG-5 in cold standby fails to start or starts but fails to run
(see Fig. 9). In this case, any repaired Emergency Diesel
Generator is restarted first, otherwise, the Gas Turbine
Generator are restarted. The ensuing possible sequence
of events are already covered by scenarios (i)-(iii), and
it is, therefore, recommended to not explicitly redefine
these in D10, for simplicity. It is deducible that the failure
of DG-5 induces the same response sequence as grid or
switchyard failure. Therefore, recreating a LOOP event
accounts for the failure of DG-5. Hence,
D10 =

2 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
4 1 2 2
4 2 2 2
 D′1 = D1 D′2 = D2
v. GT1 (node 3) starts up successfully and enters the start-957
up state (see Fig. 10). Recall, states 7 and 8 account for958
the time taken by the operator to initiate the start-up of959
the generator. However, since both GT1 and GT2 (node960
4) are in the same location, they are exposed to equal961
delays. Hence, the transitions, 7 → 4 and 5 → 8, of962
GT1 and GT2 are equal. To ensure the satisfaction of this963
constraint, when GT1 enters state 4, GT2 too is forced964
to state 4 if it is in state 7 or state 8, if it is in state965
5. Similarly, when GT1 enters state 8, GT2 is forced to966
state 8 if it is in state 5 or state 4 if it is in state 7. This967
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TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF THE STATIC SBO INDICES OBTAINED
LOOP Type p1 fs (per yr) p2 % of SBO at Start-Up Simulation Samples
Grid 0.0033 6.18× 10−3 0.0022 29.23 1× 108
Switchyard 0.0035 3.65× 10−3 0.0153 27.97 4.5× 107
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Fig. 14. Probability of SBO duration exceedance
behaviour is expressed by the first four rows of D3, as968
shown in (20).969
vi. GT2 (node 4) starts up successfully and enters the start-970
up state (see Figure 10). This scenario has the same effect971
on GT1 (node 3) as scenario (v) has on GT2. Therefore,972
the ensuing sequence of events is accounted for by the973
first 4 rows of D4, as shown in (20).974
D3 =

8 4 5 8
8 4 7 4
4 4 5 8
4 4 7 4
2 4 3 7
2 4 2 2
2 4 8 8
2 4 5 5
2 4 6 6

D4 =

8 3 5 8
8 3 7 4
4 3 5 8
4 3 7 4
2 3 3 7
2 3 2 2
2 3 8 8
2 3 5 5
2 3 6 6

D′3 = D
′
4 =

2 1 2 2
5 1 2 2
6 1 2 2
8 1 2 2

(20)
975
vii. GT1 fails to run. GT2 is restarted, if it is available for976
start-up, otherwise the system checks whether or not the977
failed diesel generators have been repaired. The first case978
is represented by the fifth row of D3, as shown in (20).979
The sequence of events involved in the second case is980
similar to the events following a LOOP. Therefore, a981
LOOP scenario is recreated, as shown in the last 4 rows982
of D3 and D′4. States 1, 4, and 7 have been left out of983
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Fig. 15. Composite frequency of first SBO exceedance
the possible GT2 states to necessitate the second case984
because, they mean either GT2 is already in operation985
(state 1), or on the verge of operation (states 4 and 7).986
viii. Similarly, GT2 failure to run produces the same effect on987
GT1 and the diesel generators, as in scenario (vii). The988
ensuing sequence of events is defined by D4 and D′3.989
We have not considered the sequence of events following990
the failure of the Gas Turbine Generators to start because,991
being the last standby sources to be called into operation, their992
start-up failure means the unavailability of the other standby993
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sources.994
C. Results and Discussions995
The proposed framework is implemented in the open source996
uncertainty quantification toolbox, OpenCOSSAN [27], [28]997
and used to quantify the SBO risk at the Maanshan nuclear998
power plant. For a grid and switchyard LOOP frequency of999
1.86 × 10−2 and 1.04 × 10−2 per/year respectively, the case1000
study was analysed on a 2.5GHz, E5-2670 v2 Intel R© Xeon1001
R© CPU. A 5% coefficient of variation was imposed on the1002
conditional probability of SBO as the simulation convergence1003
criterion. The analysis took about 3 hours, and the results1004
yielded are summarised in Table IV, Fig. 14, and Fig. 15. The1005
probability of exceedance gives a measure of the likelihood1006
of non-recovery from the SBO within a given time. The com-1007
posite frequency of exceedance is the sum of the frequencies1008
of exceedance yielded by the two LOOP categories.1009
As shown in Table IV, the probability of an SBO given a1010
LOOP is almost the same for both LOOP categories. The slight1011
difference is due to the fact that the Gas Turbine Generator1012
are unusable during switchyard centred LOOP. Their effect,1013
however, is prominent in mitigating the second SBO. The non-1014
recovery probability from an SBO, as shown in Fig 14, is1015
expressed as the non-recovery likelihood as a function of time1016
and number of safety buses. The overall SBO risk at the plant1017
is defined by the composite frequency of exceedance, as shown1018
in Fig. 15.1019
As a way of verifying the convergence of the simulation,1020
the product of p1 and the fraction of SBO at start-up, should1021
match the probability, p0, of the emergency power system1022
being unavailable at time 0. Bear in mind GT-5 and the Gas1023
Turbine Generator have no influence on p0, as a result of the1024
delays characterising their start-up. Therefore, the emergency1025
power system is unavailable at start-up only if DG-A (or DG-1026
B) is unavailable due to test/maintenance and DG-B (or DG-1027
A) fails to start or both are not in test/maintenance but fail to1028
start. If Utm is the unavailability due to test/maintenance of1029
DG-A and DG-B and ps, their start-up failure probability, p01030
is obtained as,1031
p0 = Utm (ps + ps) + (1− Utm) p2s
p0 = 2Utmps + (1− Utm) p2s
(21)
Substituting the required values in (21), an error of 3.17% is1032
realised for grid LOOP and 4.7%, for switchyard LOOP. Since1033
the error in each case is not in excess of 5%, the convergence1034
of the simulation is verified.1035
Ensuring an enhanced risk insight, the system was re-1036
analysed for three additional scenarios as follows;1037
• Case 2: No delays in the start-up of DG-5. This implies,1038
the effects of human error are removed.1039
• Case 3: Gas Turbine Generator start-up is simultaneous1040
with DG-A and DG-B. The generators, however, are kept1041
in warm standby after start-up.1042
• Case 4: A combination of Case 2 and Case 3.1043
Case 1 represents the scenario already analysed, and the results1044
for the four cases are summarised in Figs. 16 to 18 (please1045
note the composite frequencies in Figs. 16 (a) and (b) are1046
expressed on a log-scale). We have used absolute, instead of1047
conditional probabilities in Fig. 18, to ensure uniformity.1048
The following risk insights are inferred by the outcome of1049
the case study;1050
i. As shown in Fig. 14 that, station blackouts induced by1051
switchyard failures are more difficult to recover from1052
and, therefore, contribute more to the overall SBO risk1053
at the plant. In this light, feasible reliability improvement1054
programs should be designed to ensure the high reliability1055
of the switchyard. Such a reliability program should be1056
complemented by an efficient repair policy to keep the1057
non-recovery probability low.1058
ii. The gas turbine generators are the only difference be-1059
tween the recovery durations of grid and switchyard1060
LOOP. These generators, therefore, are very instrumental1061
to mitigating SBO risks at the plant, and their availability1062
should be kept high.1063
iii. Automating the start-up of DG-5 and initiating the start-1064
up of the Gas Turbine Generator just after LOOP guaran-1065
tees an improved resilience to SBO, as endorsed by Figs.1066
16 to 18. However, starting the Gas Turbine Generator1067
simultaneously with the Emergency Diesel Generator1068
brings with it additional costs, borne from fuel consump-1069
tion and maintenance. This decision, therefore, should be1070
preceded by a robust cost-benefit analysis. In fact, under1071
economic constraints, it is prudent to automate the start-1072
up of DG-5 only, as the difference between the outcomes1073
yielded by Case 2 and Case 4 is only just slight.1074
In this case study, we have ignored the explicit sensitivity and1075
importance analyses of the individual components, since these1076
quantities can be achieved even with the existing techniques.1077
V. CONCLUSIONS1078
Station blackout accidents, though a rare occurrence, can1079
have devastating consequences on a nuclear power plant’s abil-1080
ity to achieve and maintain safe shut down. Consequently, the1081
plant’s capability to cope and recover from such occurrences1082
makes a key input to its probabilistic risk assessment model.1083
In this paper, we have proposed an intuitive simulation1084
framework to model a nuclear power plant’s recovery from1085
station blackout accidents. The framework provides a simple1086
means of defining the complex interdependencies that often1087
characterise the operation of practical engineering systems,1088
and therefore, applicable without unrealistic assumptions. This1089
attribute, coupled with its ability to intuitively tolerate the1090
multi-state behaviour of the system’s building block, dis-1091
tinguishes it from the existing approaches. Its applicability1092
has been demonstrated by modelling the SBO recovery of1093
a pressurised water reactor, providing an informed insight1094
into its SBO risks. The proposed approach was able to fully1095
model the dynamic behaviour of the power system and provide1096
valuable insights on the SBO risk at the plant. The non-1097
recovery probability curve obtained, for instance, can be ab-1098
sorbed into the existing probabilistic risk assessment models,1099
getting rid of laborious fault trees. Since this curve also depicts1100
the unavailability of AC power, it can be directly compared1101
with the reliability of the plant’s SBO coping mechanism,1102
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providing an easier means of determining the need for their1103
reliability improvement. It also helps ascertain the adequacy1104
of the plant’s station blackout recovery capability, without1105
revisiting the entire model. A key desirable feature of the1106
proposed framework is its wide applicability, even to non-1107
nuclear applications.1108
In spite of their well documented limitations relative to the1109
proposed framework, the existing static fault tree-based models1110
still possess desirable attributes that give them an edge in1111
importance, sensitivity, and uncertainty analyses. With this in1112
mind, the proposed framework has been developed with the1113
view to complementing their applicability, instead of serving1114
as an explicit replacement. We have, therefore, included a clear1115
description of how its output can be incorporated into these1116
models. The framework, in addition, has been implemented in1117
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the open-source uncertainty quantification toolbox developed1118
at the Institute for Risk and Uncertainty (see [27], [28]),1119
thereby rendering it readily available.1120
The multi-state model and dependency matrices proposed,1121
create the foundation for the incorporation of additional dy-1122
namic considerations. Such considerations as the optimal num-1123
ber of maintenance teams on-site, Emergency Diesel Generator1124
failure during cold standby, optimal inspection interval, and the1125
availability of spares, are a possibility. Efforts are underway1126
to extend the framework to these considerations, other LOOP1127
categories, and incorporate epistemic uncertainties.1128
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APPENDIX1136
This Section is introduced with the view to providing a1137
detailed example of how the linear programming problem is1138
formulated, stating the exact values of the relevant parameters.1139
The goal is to enable readers to grasp, fully, the concept1140
proposed in this paper, as well as provide a benchmark for1141
validating their implementation of this concept.1142
Consider the 3-component pipeline shown in Fig. 19,
adapted from [22]. A maximum of 4 tons of oil could be
pumped from the source, Xin, to the output, Xout, where
the demand is fixed at 3.5 tons. The state-space of each of
the other components is shown, with the number beside each
state denoting the capacity of the component in that state. The
equivalent graph model of the system is shown in Fig. 20.
Notice the two extra nodes, 1 and 5, representing the source
and output, respectively. The available information is sufficient
to formulate the linear programming problem and derive its
parameters. The first step is to define the adjacency matrix,
since all the other parameters depend on it. From Fig. 20, the
adjacency matrix, A, is obtained as;
A =

0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0

The next task is to deduce the edge and incidence matrices, e
and Γ, respectively. They are obtained thus,
e =

1 2
1 3
2 4
3 4
4 5
 Γ =

1 1 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 −1 1
0 0 0 0 −1

With A, e, and Γ known, the linear programming problem is1143
formulated as follows,1144
1) At time 0, all the components are in their best per-
formance state. The inequality constraint, therefore, is
expressed as,
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


X12
X13
X24
X34
X45
 ≤

4.0
1.5
2
4
3.5

2) The equality constraint is expressed as,
 −1 0 1 0 00 −1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 −1 1


X12
X13
X24
X34
X45
 =
 00
0

3) The bounds on the flow through the edges are,
lb =

0
0
0
0
0
 ub =

1.5
2
1.5
2
3.5

4) The objective function is expressed as,
Ψ =
( −1 −1 0 0 0 )

X12
X13
X24
X34
X45

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